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When observing another individual’s actions, we can
both recognize their actions and infer their beliefs
concerning the physical and social environment. The
extent to which visual adaptation influences action
recognition and conceptually later stages of processing
involved in deriving the belief state of the actor remains
unknown. To explore this we used virtual reality (life-size
photorealistic actors presented in stereoscopic three
dimensions) to see how visual adaptation influences the
perception of individuals in naturally unfolding social
scenes at increasingly higher levels of action
understanding. We presented scenes in which one actor
picked up boxes (of varying number and weight), after
which a second actor picked up a single box. Adaptation
to the first actor’s behavior systematically changed
perception of the second actor. Aftereffects increased
with the duration of the first actor’s behavior, declined
exponentially over time, and were independent of view
direction. Inferences about the second actor’s
expectation of box weight were also distorted by
adaptation to the first actor. Distortions in action
recognition and actor expectations did not, however,
extend across different actions, indicating that
adaptation is not acting at an action-independent
abstract level but rather at an action-dependent level.
We conclude that although adaptation influences more
complex inferences about belief states of individuals,
this is likely to be a result of adaptation at an earlier
action recognition stage rather than adaptation
operating at a higher, more abstract level in mentalizing
or simulation systems.
Introduction
The actions of other individuals can be understood
on multiple levels. We can detect and recognize another
individual’s actions, understand the goal of their
actions, and infer their intentions, beliefs, and desires
from just action information. Our ability to make sense
of the actions of other individuals is critical for
operating successfully in a complex social environment
(Frith & Frith, 2012). It is important, therefore, that we
have a clear understanding of how we process action
information in natural social scenes.
Analysis of actions at increasingly higher levels of
cognitive understanding occurs in a hierarchy of
processing stages across a network of brain areas
(Decety & Grezes, 1999; Giese & Poggio, 2003;
Hamilton & Grafton, 2006; Lestou, Pollick, & Kourtzi,
2008; Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009; Wurm &
Lingnau, 2015), and our evaluation of complex social
scenes involves simultaneous processing at these
multiple stages. Following category-nonspeciﬁc visual
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analysis in earlier regions of the visual system, the ﬁrst
stage in the bodily action processing network is thought
to be within the superior temporal sulcus (STS). Here,
neurons are found that respond selectively to the sight
of speciﬁc actions (Chitty, Perrett, Mistlin, & Potter,
1985; Oram & Perrett, 1996; Perrett et al., 1985, 1989),
and this region in humans is thought to underlie the
recognition of actions (Allison, Puce, & McCarthy,
2000; Grossman et al., 2000; Puce, Allison, Bentin,
Gore, & McCarthy, 1998; Puce & Perrett, 2003). In
addition, the STS may represent elementary forms of
action intentions (Jellema, Baker, Wicker, & Perrett,
2000): STS neurons have been shown to be sensitive to
actions embedded in speciﬁc action sequences and to
code for actions most likely to happen in the immediate
future given the immediate perceptual history (Jellema
& Perrett, 2003; Perrett, Xiao, Barraclough, Keysers, &
Oram, 2009), which puts it in a position to represent the
goal directedness of actions (Jellema & Perrett, 2005).
However, a fuller understanding of actor intentions and
beliefs is likely to be derived during subsequent stages
(Hamilton & Grafton, 2006; Van Overwalle & Baetens,
2009), within either the inferior parietal cortex (e.g.,
Becchio et al., 2012; Fogassi et al., 2005; Van Over-
walle, 2009) or the frontal motor regions (e.g., Becchio
et al., 2012; Iacoboni et al., 2005) or through
interaction between these regions.
Adaptation is a ubiquitous sensory processing
mechanism, but it is unclear how it inﬂuences the
processing of action information at these different
levels of understanding. In psychophysics experiments,
adaptation consists of prolonged exposure to a
stimulus with closely deﬁned parameters, which is
thought to result in a suppression of neural mecha-
nisms that underlie the coding of the speciﬁc charac-
teristics of the stimulus. Perceptual judgments of test
stimuli presented following adaptation can be pro-
foundly biased, and the character of these aftereffects
can help illustrate the nature of the underlying neural
mechanisms. Recently it has become clear that adap-
tation not only inﬂuences early visual processing but
also has an effect on increasingly higher and more
abstract representations, including face identity (Leo-
pold, O’Toole, Vetter, & Blanz, 2001), face emotion
(Benton et al., 2007), face trustworthiness (Keefe,
Dzhelyova, Perrett, & Barraclough, 2013), action
recognition (Barraclough & Jellema, 2011; Barra-
clough, Keith, Xiao, Oram, & Perrett, 2009; de la Rosa,
Streuber, Giese, Bulthoff, & Curio, 2014), implied
actions (Lorteije et al., 2007), action gender (Troje,
Sadr, Geyer, & Nakayama, 2006), action emotion
(Roether, Omlor, Christensen, & Giese, 2009; Win-
cenciak, Ingham, Jellema, & Barraclough, 2016), and
even multimodal representations of actor identity and
emotion (e.g., Hills, Elward, & Lewis, 2010; Konkle,
Wang, Hayward, & Moore, 2009; Pye & Bestelmeyer,
2015; Skuk & Schweinberger, 2013; Zaske, Schwein-
berger, & Kawahara, 2010). In this study we set out to
investigate the extent to which perceptual adaptation
can inﬂuence increasingly higher levels of action
understanding.
Previous research has indicated that visual adapta-
tion can inﬂuence action recognition, but it is unknown
whether the more complex inferences we make about
the internal mental state of the actors themselves can
also be inﬂuenced. Visual adaptation to hand actions
(Barraclough et al., 2009) and whole-body actions
(Barraclough & Jellema, 2011) inﬂuences the subse-
quent recognition of hand and whole-body actions,
respectively. These effects are likely to be due to the
selective adaptation of single neurons within the STS
that are responsive to speciﬁc actions (Kuravi, Cag-
giano, Giese, & Vogels, 2016). Although adaptation
paradigms have been used to demonstrate that action
aftereffects can be modulated by social context (de la
Rosa et al., 2014), these effects are probably due to a
top-down modulation of action recognition mecha-
nisms. Adaptation can inﬂuence the perception of more
abstract concepts conveyed by actors, such as gender
(Roether et al., 2009) and emotion (Troje et al., 2006).
However, both of these studies used point light
‘‘biological motion’’ stimuli, and it is not clear whether
the emotional action adaptation observed by Roether
et al. (2009) is due to adaptation to the perceived
emotional state of the actors portrayed by the point
light stimuli or whether these results can be explained
by a more simple adaptation to the complex motion
patterns of the stimuli or the kinematics of the
biological motion ﬁgure. In this study, we therefore
tested the effect of visual adaptation on action
recognition mechanisms, but we also tested the effect of
adaptation on a conceptually later stage of processing
involved in deriving the belief state of the actor. To do
this, we adapted a paradigm used previously to
demonstrate action adaptation (Barraclough et al.,
2009) while using stimuli similar to those of Gre`zes et
al. (2004), who examined the neural mechanisms
underlying both action perception and actors’ beliefs
about their physical environment. In the Gre`zes et al.
(2004) study, actors picked boxes up off the ﬂoor and
exhibited different variations in action kinematics
depending on the weight of the box. During the
observation of such stimuli, our action recognition
mechanisms are able to distinguish such subtle differ-
ences in kinematics (Gre`zes, Frith, & Passingham,
2004; Runeson & Frykholm, 1981, 1983). Furthermore,
when actors had correct or false expectations (or
beliefs) about the weights of the boxes they were about
to lift, they executed their actions with different
kinematics. This information is available to observers,
who can then use it to extract the actors’ beliefs, or
expectations, about the box weights (see Gre`zes et al.,
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2004; Runeson & Frykholm, 1983). In our study, to
assess how adaptation inﬂuenced action recognition
judgements, we examined the effect of adaptation to
actors picking up boxes of different weights on the
judgment of the weight of boxes picked up by
subsequent actors (cf. Barraclough et al., 2009). To
assess how adaptation inﬂuenced inferences about the
belief state of the actor, we examined how adaptation
to actors with correct—and incorrect—expectations of
the weights of boxes inﬂuenced judgements made about
subsequent actors’ expectations of box weight.
Previous adaptation studies have used either unnat-
uralistic, oversimpliﬁed stimuli presented on small
screens or contrived experimental designs. This can
lead to difﬁculty in determining whether these previous
results can be generalized to the natural social
environments we navigate. Experiments have been
conducted this way for good reason. Stimuli are
simpliﬁed (e.g., biological motion stimuli, cropped
videos of body parts, isolated actors presented out of
context) in order to isolate and study the processing of
speciﬁc features of the actions represented. In addition,
typical adaptation experiments with action stimuli (and
face stimuli) have followed established methods for the
assessment of mechanisms underlying the processing of
more simple stimuli (e.g., oriented lines, moving dot
ﬁelds). A typical trial might involve a presentation of
an adapting stimulus on a blank screen for a period of
time, its removal from the screen for a period of time,
and then a brief or ﬂashed presentation of a subsequent
test stimulus on the screen again. In contrast to these
previous studies, we sought to measure aftereffects
under naturalistic viewing conditions. In the experi-
ments we describe here, participants viewed two actors
in the same scene; one actor was assigned as the
‘‘adapting’’ actor and the other as the ‘‘test’’ actor.
Scenes with both actors in the room unfolded in a
naturalistic fashion: Actions were performed in se-
quences without the scene containing the actors
instantly appearing and disappearing from the screen,
as for all previous experiments. Furthermore, given
that some previous evidence (e.g., Snow et al., 2011)
has indicated that adaptation might occur differently
after observation of two-dimensional (2D) objects
rendered on a small screen compared with the
observation of real objects, we wanted to assess
whether the mode of presentation inﬂuenced whole-
body aftereffects. We therefore examined adaptation
under highly naturalistic viewing conditions using
virtual reality to present three-dimensional (3D) life-
size orthostereoscopic actors as well as under more
typical conditions experienced in the psychophysics lab,
where the actors were presented in 2D on a small
screen.
We examined the effect of adaptation on action
recognition and inferences of actor belief state in a
series of six experiments. In Experiment 1 we assessed
whether the way that action scenes were viewed
inﬂuenced action recognition aftereffects by presenting
action scenes in life-size orthostereoscopic 3D, life-size
2D, and small-scale 2D formats. Aftereffects resulting
from adaptation of stimuli processed in the early visual
cortex show sensitivity to changes in low-level charac-
teristics such as stimulus position, size, and orientation.
In contrast, higher level aftereffects, resulting from
adaptation at later stages of processing, show relative
insensitivity to changes in lower level stimulus charac-
teristics. For example, whole-body aftereffects are
observed irrespective of the viewpoint from which
adapting and test actors are viewed (Barraclough &
Jellema, 2011). In order to evaluate whether action
recognition aftereffects were due to adaptation of lower
or higher level processing mechanisms, in Experiment 2
we examined whether action aftereffects arose from
adaptation to view-dependent or view-independent
mechanisms by measuring aftereffects when the
adapting and test actors were seen from the same or
different perspectives. Visual aftereffects typically show
characteristic build-up in strength with increasing
exposure to the adapting stimulus and decay over time
(e.g., Barraclough, Ingham, & Page, 2012; Barraclough
et al., 2009; Hershenson, 1989; Leopold, Rhodes,
Muller, & Jeffery, 2005; Rhodes, Jeffery, Clifford, &
Leopold, 2007). To test whether action recognition
aftereffects would show dynamics similar to those seen
previously, we varied both the number of adapting
actions executed (Experiment 3) and the duration of the
interval between the actions executed by the adapting
and test actors (Experiment 4). In Experiments 5 and 6
we evaluated whether visual adaptation inﬂuenced
inferences about the belief state of individuals in the
social scene. In Experiment 5 we investigated whether
visual adaptation to the perceived belief state of one
actor generated perceptual aftereffects that distorted
the perceived belief state of another actor in the same
scene. In addition, we tested whether the way that
action scenes were viewed inﬂuenced aftereffects by
presenting scenes in life-size orthostereoscopic 3D and
small-scale 2D formats. Finally, in Experiment 6 we
tested whether distortions in the perception of an
individual’s belief state following visual adaptation
were due to adaptation at a high level of understanding,
at which the belief state of individuals is derived.
General method
Participants
Participants were either University of Hull or
University of York students or staff and either were
Journal of Vision (2016) 16(9):9, 1–20 Keefe et al. 3
Downloaded From: http://jov.arvojournals.org/pdfaccess.ashx?url=/data/Journals/JOV/935414/ on 08/10/2016
paid or volunteered to take part in experiments. All had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and stereoacuity
was better than 40 arcsec for 3D stimulus presentation.
Experiments were approved by the ethics committee of
the Department of Psychology at the University of Hull
and the University of York and were performed in
accordance with the ethical standards laid down in the
1990 Declaration of Helsinki. Written consent to take
part in the studies was obtained from all participants.
All participants were naive to the purposes of the study.
Stimuli
Stimuli were ﬁlmed with a custom 3D camera built
by combining two TM900 digital cameras (Panasonic,
Kadoma, Japan; each ﬁlming at 19203 1080 pixels and
50 frames/s progressive scan) mounted on a solid
aluminum plate and set to a 66-mm parallel interaxial
distance. During ﬁlming the camera was placed at a
height of 1.22 m and a distance of 4.1 m from the
virtual screen plane in order to ensure the best possible
correspondence between the camera viewpoint of the
scene and ﬁnal display to the participants. All objects
were viewed at a depth behind the screen plane (i.e.,
positive parallax).
Stimulus set 1: Box-lifting stimuli; actors with correct
expectations of box weights
Two males and two females were ﬁlmed lifting
boxes onto a table from the ﬂoor (see Figure 1a).
Actors performed the lifts when facing either the left
table or the right table, and all actions were ﬁlmed
when the actor faced the respective table from both
the left and right sides of the table. For all actions,
actors were always informed about the weight of the
boxes prior to lifting. We refer to actions performed at
the left table as adapting actions and actions per-
formed at the right table as test actions. Adapting
actions were lifts of 2- and 18-kg boxes or no action
(standing still). Boxes (one, two, four, or eight) were
arranged in a line (along the depth dimension), and
actions were always directed toward the farthest box
ﬁrst. Each lift took 4.5 s to execute while guided by a
timing beep. Test actions were lifts of 6-, 8-, 10-, 12-,
and 14-kg boxes. Boxes were always positioned
equidistant from the front and back of the table (along
the depth dimension) such that the mean position of
the adapting and test actors in depth was the same
across all actions.
A pilot experiment was conducted to examine
whether the kinematics of the lifting actions allowed
observers to discriminate the weight of the box being
lifted. Observers’ ratings of box weight were found to
correlate highly with the physical weight of the box
(slope¼ 0.33, R2¼ 0.98). For adapting actions during
Experiments 1 through 4 we selected the actions
executed by the actor (female) whose lifts of the 2- and
18-kg boxes were perceived as the lightest and
heaviest, respectively (slope ¼ 0.48). The actions
executed by the remaining three actors (two males,
one female) were used as test actions, such that the
identity of the adapting and test actors was always
different.
Stimulus set 2: Box-lifting stimuli; actors with incorrect
expectations of box weights
Two male and three female actors were ﬁlmed lifting
boxes onto a table from the ﬂoor. The actors were
positioned to the left of either the left or right table and
were viewed from behind at 458 to the camera in order
to occlude all facial information. During ﬁlming, actors
were deceived such that they had incorrect expectations
(beliefs) about the weight of the box they were to lift
(cf. Gre`zes et al., 2004). Adapting actions and test
actions were ﬁlmed while they were performed at both
the left and right tables. For adapting stimuli, actors
executed 20 box lifts at the left table. On the majority of
lifts (18/20) the actor had the correct expectation that
the box weighed 10 kg; however, two boxes had
unexpected weights (2 and 18 kg; i.e., the actor
overestimated or underestimated the weight of the box,
respectively). For test stimuli, actors completed 40 box
lifts at the right table. On the majority of lifts (36/40)
the actor had the correct expectation that the box
weighed 10 kg; however, four boxes had different
weights (6, 8, 12, and 14 kg; i.e., the actor had differing
degrees of over- and underestimation of the box
weight).
Pilot testing indicated that observers could discrim-
inate test actor expectation (from large overestimations
through true estimations to large underestimations)
from the movies of test actions (correlation between
actor expectation and observers’ rating, slope¼ 0.36, r2
¼ 0.96). The actor who conveyed the greatest degree of
under- or overestimation of the box weights was
selected as the adapting actor, and the remaining four
actors were used as test actors.
Stimulus set 3: Box-lifting and lever-pulling stimuli; actors
with incorrect expectations of force required
Two female actors were ﬁlmed lifting boxes onto a
table from the ﬂoor and pulling a lever emerging from
the surface of a cabinet. The actors were viewed from
behind at 458 to the camera in order to occlude all facial
information. To generate stimuli in which actors had a
true or false expectation about the force required to
execute the action (lift or pull), we organized separate
blocks of ﬁlming to manipulate actor expectation.
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Adapting actions were lever pulls and were ﬁlmed with
the actor on the right side of the room (see Figure 1b).
Actors had a correct estimation of the force necessary
to pull the lever (1 or 9 kg) during 90% of pulls; during
10% of pulls, the weight was unexpectedly changed to 5
kg to generate overestimates (during 9-kg pulls) and
underestimates (during 1-kg pulls). Test actions were
box lifts executed while facing the table on the left side
of the room. Actors executed box lifts when they had
the correct expectation of the box weight (2.5, 5, 7.5,
10, 12.5, 15, and 17.5 kg) during 90% of lifts. During
10% of lifts (once per weight) the weight was changed
to 10 kg, resulting in differing degrees of over- and
underestimation. Actors also completed lifts of 10-kg
boxes in which the box weight was held constant. In
total, actors completed 350 lifts, providing ﬁve
instances for each level of under- or overestimation and
50 instances of the lift of the 10-kg box when 10 kg was
expected.
Although pull action weights (1–9 kg) were nomi-
nally smaller than lift action weights (2–18 kg), the
force required to execute the actions was approximately
similar. The lever in the cabinet was geared to increase
the force required to execute the pull action. In
addition, pulls were executed with one hand rather than
two hands, making this action harder to execute than
the two-handed box lift.
Stimulus presentation
Stimuli were presented to participants in three ways:
(a) life size with orthostereoscopic 3D, (b) life size in
2D, and (c) small scale in 2D. Life-size orthostereo-
scopic 3D and life-size 2D stimuli, subtending 4.57 m3
Figure 1. Schematic of the experimental designs. Each panel shows cropped individual stills at different time points in a continuous
movie presented during an example trial. (a) Experimental design for Experiments 1 through 4. The adapting actor was on the left and
test actors were on the right. Durations of the adapting phase and durations of the interstimulus interval varied across experiments.
During Experiment 2 (not illustrated), adapting and test actors executed actions on either side of the static table in order to change
the view of the action. (b) Experimental design for Experiment 6. The adapting actor was on the right and test actors were on the left.
Experiment 5 (not illustrated) was similar; however, the adapting action was a box-lifting action.
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2.44 m (5083338), were presented on a 5.33 m32.44 m
(588 3 338) rear-projection screen (two Mirage 2000
Christie Digital DLP projectors [Christie, Cypress, CA]
were used, effective full-screen resolution¼ 224031024
pixels, 100-Hz refresh rate). Stimuli were viewed
through active liquid-crystal display shutter glasses
(nuVision 60 GX [McNaughton Inc., Beaverton, OR],
triggered by StereoGraphics Infra-Red emitters [Ster-
eoGraphics, San Rafael, CA]). Participants sat such
that their eyes were positioned at a height of 1.22 m and
a distance of 4.1 m from the screen plane (to the
cyclopean eye). Stimuli viewed from this position were
orthostereoscopic such that the stereo images of the
stimuli were viewed in real-world dimensions. Distor-
tions in perceived depth induced in participants with
interpupillary distances greater or less than the
interaxial distance of the camera would be too small to
be reliably detected based on normal stereoacuity (10
arcsec; Dodgson, 2004). For life-size 2D presentation,
participants viewed only the left movie channel through
the liquid-crystal display shutter glasses. Small-scale
2D stimuli for Experiment 1 were presented on a
Philips 202P40 22-in. cathode ray tube monitor (16003
1200 pixels, 100-Hz refresh rate [Philips, Amsterdam,
Netherlands]; stimuli were scaled such that they
subtended 568 3 338 with a viewing distance of 43 cm).
Small-scale 2D stimuli for other experiments were
presented on a 24-in. thin-ﬁlm transistor monitor (Acer
GD245HQ, 19203 1080 pixels, 100-Hz refresh rate
[Acer, New Taipei, Taiwan]; stimuli were scaled such
that they subtended 498 3 298 at a viewing distance of
57 cm).
Experimental procedures
A personal computer running MATLAB 2010a
(MathWorks, Natick, MA) and Psychtoolbox (Brai-
nard, 1997) controlled the experiments, displayed the
stimuli, and recorded participant responses. A custom
movie playback engine was used to display 3D movies.
The details of the experimental procedures for each of
the six experiments are described in the subsections
below.
Experiment 1: Adaptation to actions
in naturalistic environments
Experiment 1 tested whether observers experienced
visual aftereffects in recognizing an individual’s actions
when the actions were executed in a naturalistic social
scene containing another person. In addition, we
assessed whether the way that action scenes were
viewed inﬂuenced action recognition aftereffects by
presenting action scenes in life-size orthostereoscopic
3D, life-size 2D, and small-scale 2D formats.
Method
Participants
Twenty four participants (13 females, 11 males;
mean age¼ 22.5 years, SD ¼ 3.9) took part in the
experiment.
Stimuli
Movies were made in which the actions of two
individual (adapting and test) actors occurred in
succession in a naturalistic fashion. In a typical
adaptation experiment, the adapting stimulus is pre-
sented and then disappears from the screen, and then a
test stimulus is presented (e.g., Barraclough & Jellema,
2011; de la Rosa et al., 2014; Troje et al., 2006). In
contrast to these previous studies, both the adapting
and test actors remained in the scene throughout the
trial. Different stimuli from Set 1 were combined using
video compositing (Vegas Pro 10, Sony, Tokyo, Japan)
to construct new movies in which the adapting actor
appeared on the left and a test actor appeared on the
right in a natural-looking room scene. This process
ensured that the whole sequence of actions appeared in
a realistic fashion, with no intervals in the video stream
or unnatural changes in either of the actors’ behavior.
However, the relationship between the adapting and
test actions was tightly controlled, as in previous
artiﬁcial presentation of stimulus sequences during
adaptation experiments (e.g., Barraclough et al., 2012;
Troje et al., 2006).
Procedure
The experiment was a within-subject factorial design
with three viewing conditions (life-size orthostereo-
scopic 3D, life-size 2D, and small-scale 2D) and three
adaptation conditions (adapt heavy: lift 18 kg, Movie 1;
adapt light: lift 2 kg, Movie 2; no adaptation, Movie 3).
In order to measure shifts in action recognition with the
presence of an adapting actor, it was necessary to
ensure that participants believed they were viewing
different test actors on different trials. With naturalistic
actions executed by identiﬁable actors, each action
execution can have idiosyncratic kinematics and thus
be highly recognizable. We needed a large number of
trials in our experimental design to get accurate
measures of perception with and without adaptation,
but we also wanted to ensure that unique action
executions were not viewed by participants so often
that they became familiar and participants realized that
they were repeatedly viewing the same test action.
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Therefore, we used ﬁve test action conditions (lift 6, 8,
10, 12, and 14 kg) and three test actor identities (two
males, one female). Test action condition and test actor
identity were not conditions of interest and therefore
were not analyzed.
Each of the three viewing conditions was tested on
separate days, and viewing condition was counterbal-
anced across participants. On each day, the no-
adaptation condition was always tested ﬁrst in a single
block. Then, the adapt heavy and adapt light condi-
tions were tested in separate subsequent blocks, where
adaptation condition was counterbalanced across
participants and viewing conditions. Within a block of
testing, all other conditions (ﬁve test action conditions
and three test actor identities) were randomized such
that there were in total 15 trials/block.
At the start of each adaptation block (adapt heavy,
adapt light), an initial preadaptation video was
displayed three times in which the adapting actor,
alone in the room, lifted all eight boxes of the same
adapting weight (24 lifts). Following a 1-s black
screen, the ﬁrst trial commenced. Each trial began
with 2 s of adapting and test actor inactivity (to allow
stereo fusion; Hoffman, Girshick, Akeley, & Banks,
2008). This was followed by the adapting actor lifting
eight boxes onto the table, a 1-s inter-action interval
(duration between the offset of the last adapting
action and the onset of the test action) during which
both actors stood still, the test actor lifting his or her
box onto the table, and ﬁnally 0.5 s during which both
actors stood still (see the lower sequence in Figure 1a).
At the end of the trial the screen turned black,
indicating that the participant had to respond during a
1.5-s interval. If no response was registered during the
interval, an error beep was played and the trial was
repeated randomly later in the block.
The no-adaptation block began with both the
adapting and test actors standing still in front of a
single box for the same period of time it would have
taken the adapting actors to execute the eight lift
actions (38 s). The trial structure was identical to that in
the adapting trials except that the adapting actor stood
still throughout the entirety of each trial (see the upper
sequence in Figure 1a). At the end of each trial,
participants made their responses on a wireless numeric
keyboard and indicated the weight of the box lifted by
the test actor, choosing between 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16,
and 18 kg. Breaks were given between each block of
testing, and the experiment took approximately 45 min
to complete.
We calculated aftereffects for each of the three
viewing conditions (life-size orthostereoscopic 3D, life-
size 2D, and small-scale 2D) and each of the two
adaptation conditions (adapt heavy, adapt light). For
each participant and viewing condition, we subtracted
the mean ratings of the weights of boxes lifted by the
test actors for control trials from the mean ratings of
the weights of the boxes lifted by the test actors
following adapting actors lifting light or heavy boxes.
This generated both ‘‘heavy’’ and ‘‘light’’ aftereffects
for each viewing condition and participant. Positive
values indicated that test actors appeared to lift heavier
boxes, negative values indicated that test actors
appeared to lift lighter boxes, and zero indicated no
effect of the adapting actor.
Results
Experiment 1 examined whether action recognition
was distorted by the actions of another individual in a
naturalistic social scene. This was examined for life-
size orthostereoscopic 3D, life-size 2D, and small-scale
2D presentation formats. A 23 3 analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with adaptation condition and viewing
condition as within-subject factors showed that the
actions executed by the adapting actor had a
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the recognition of the actions
executed by the test actors—magnitude of aftereffects,
main effect of adaptation condition: F(1, 23)¼69.88, p
, 0.001, gp
2 ¼ 0.75 (see Figure 2a). Test actors
appeared to lift heavier boxes after the adapting actor
lifting light boxes and appeared to lift lighter boxes
after the adapting actor lifting heavy boxes. The
presentation format did not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence
aftereffect magnitudes—main effect of viewing con-
dition, F(2, 46) ¼ 1.80, p ¼ 0.177, gp2 ¼ 0.07;
interaction between adaptation condition and viewing
condition, F(2, 46) ¼ 0.43, p ¼ 0.655, gp2 ¼ 0.02—
indicating that action recognition aftereffects mea-
sured in more traditional psychophysical laboratory
environments are of equivalent magnitude to those
measured during more naturalistic viewing conditions.
The distortions in the perception of the actions of the
test actors resulting from the actions executed by the
adapting actors are large and consistent with repulsive
action aftereffects observed following adaptation to
hand actions (Barraclough et al., 2009; de la Rosa et
al., 2014) and whole-body actions (Barraclough &
Jellema, 2011).
Experiment 2: View dependence of
action aftereffects
Experiment 2 examined whether the action afteref-
fects observed in Experiment 1 resulted from adapta-
tion to view-dependent or view-independent
mechanisms. View-independent aftereffects would
suggest adaptation of high-level representations. We
measured action aftereffects when the adapting and
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test actions were seen from similar or different
perspectives.
Method
Participants
Seventeen participants (nine females, eight males;
mean age¼ 22.0 years, SD ¼ 2.4) took part in the
experiment. (The number of participants was based on
a power analysis of the aftereffects measured during
Experiment 1.)
Stimuli
Movies were made in which the actions of two
individual (adapting and test) actors occurred in
succession in a naturalistic fashion. Movies were
similar to those used in Experiment 1. However, three
viewpoint conditions were presented in which (a)
adapting and test actors faced left (same view left), (b)
adapting and test actors faced right (same view right),
and (c) the adapting actor faced right and the test actor
faced left (different view).
Procedure
The experiment was a within-subject factorial design
with three adaptation conditions (adapt heavy: lift 18
kg; adapt light: lift 2 kg; no adaptation) and three
viewpoint conditions (same view left, same view right,
different view). In addition, there were three test action
conditions (lift 6, 10, and 14 kg) and two test actor
identities (one male, one female). Test action condition
and test actor identity were not conditions of interest
and therefore were not analyzed. However, they were
varied in order to ensure that participants viewed
different actions during experimental testing. No-
adaptation and adaptation conditions were presented
in separate blocks of testing.
No-adaptation control blocks were completed both
before and after an adaptation block. Results from
both blocks were averaged together to provide one
Figure 2. Action recognition aftereffects. Positive values indicate that test actors appeared to lift heavier boxes than they actually
lifted, negative values indicated that test actors appeared to lift lighter boxes, and zero indicated no effect of the adapting actor. (a)
Aftereffects observed with different viewing conditions (Experiment 1). (b) Effect of viewpoint of the adapting and test actors on
aftereffect magnitudes (Experiment 2). (c) Increasing adaptation duration increases aftereffect magnitude (Experiment 3), which is
best modeled by exponential functions (light aftereffect, R ¼ 0.91; heavy aftereffect, R ¼ 0.91), plotted. (d) Increasing the interval
between adapting and test actions reduces aftereffect magnitude (Experiment 4), best modeled by an exponential decay function
(light aftereffect, R¼ 0.91) and a logarithmic function (heavy aftereffect, R¼ 0.86), plotted. Error bars indicate standard error of the
mean.
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measure of participants’ ratings of each weight of box,
each test actor identity, and each view of the test actors.
Control blocks were conducted both before and after
the adaptation block. There were 12 movies used
during each control block: 2 test actors (male, female)3
3 test action conditions (6, 10, and 14 kg)3 2 test actor
views (face left, face right). During each control block,
each of the 12 movies was presented ﬁve times in a
pseudorandom order. Test procedures were the same as
for Experiment 1 no-adaptation blocks; however, the
intertrial interval was 3 s, and trials began with the test
actor standing still for 2 s followed by the action
without the presence of any adapting actor in the room.
Between the two control blocks was a single
adaptation block. During the adaptation block 36
different movies were presented: 2 adaptation conditions
(adapt heavy, adapt light)3 3 viewpoints (same view
left, same view right, different view)3 2 test actors
(male, female)3 3 test action conditions (6, 10, and 14
kg). Movies (trials) occurred once in a random order. All
other test procedures were as for the adaptation blocks
in Experiment 1 except no preadaptation was used, the
intertrial interval was 3 s, heavy and light adapting
conditions were interleaved in the same block rather
than being separated into their own blocks, a break of 1
to 2 min was given to participants 18 trials into the block
to help reduce participant fatigue, and all testing was
performed with participants viewing movies presented
on a 24-in. thin-ﬁlm transistor screen (see Method).
We calculated aftereffects for each of the three
viewing conditions (same view left, same view right,
different views) and each of the two adaptation
conditions (adapt heavy, adapt light). We subtracted
the mean ratings of the weights of boxes lifted by the
test actors for control trials when they were facing left
from the mean ratings of the weights of the boxes lifted
by the test actors for adaptation trials when the test
actors faced left (same view left, different views) in each
adaptation condition to generate both heavy and light
aftereffects. In addition, we subtracted the mean ratings
of the weights of boxes lifted by the test actors for
control trials when they were facing right from the
mean ratings of the weights of the boxes lifted by the
test actors for adaptation trials when the test actor
faced right (same view right) in each adaptation
condition to generate both a heavy and a light
aftereffect. Positive values indicated that test actors
appeared to lift heavier boxes, negative values indicated
that test actors appeared to lift lighter boxes, and zero
indicated no effect of the adapting actor.
Results
A 23 3 within-subject ANOVA was used to test the
differences between the magnitudes of aftereffects
under the different adaptation conditions and view-
point conditions (Figure 2b). Aftereffects generated
when the adapting actor lifted heavy or light boxes
were signiﬁcantly different: main effect of adaptation
condition, F(1, 16)¼53.61, p, 0.001, gp2¼0.77. There
was no main effect of viewpoint, F(2, 32)¼ 1.45, p¼
0.25, gp
2¼ 0.08, nor was there a signiﬁcant interaction
between viewpoint and adaptation condition, F(2, 32)¼
0.06, p ¼ 0.94, gp2¼ 0.00. Importantly, signiﬁcant
differences in light and heavy aftereffects were still
observed irrespective of the direction the actors faced
(ts . 4.77, ps , 0.001; see Figure 2b). In conclusion,
these results show that the action recognition afteref-
fects are viewpoint independent (cf. Barraclough &
Jellema, 2011) and thus result from changes to high-
level action processing mechanisms.
Experiment 3: Effect of action
exposure on aftereffect magnitude
Increasing adaptation exposure typically increases
the magnitude of aftereffects in a logarithmic fashion
(e.g., Barraclough et al., 2009, 2012; Hershenson, 1989,
1993; Leopold et al., 2005). In Experiment 3, we
therefore examined whether the action recognition
aftereffects observed in Experiments 1 and 2 were
dependent on the duration of exposure to the adapting
actor as he or she lifted increasing numbers of boxes.
Method
Participants
Seventeen participants (11 females, six males; mean
age ¼ 22.3 years, SD ¼ 3.8) took part in the
experiment. (The number of participants was based on
a power analysis of the aftereffects measured during
Experiment 1.)
Stimuli
Movies were made in which the actions of two
individual (adapting and test) actors occurred in
succession in a naturalistic fashion. Movies were
similar to those used in Experiment 1; however, test
actors were combined with the adapting actor lifting
different numbers of boxes (one, two, four, and eight)
onto the table.
Procedure
The experiment was a within-subject factorial design
with three adaptation conditions (adapt heavy: lift 18 kg;
adapt light: lift 2 kg; no adaptation) and four adapting
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action repetitions (one, two, four, and eight repeats). In
addition, there were three test action conditions (lift 6,
10, and 14 kg) and three test actor identities (two males,
one female). Test action condition and test actor identity
were not conditions of interest and therefore were not
analyzed; however, they were varied in order to ensure
that participants viewed different actions during exper-
imental testing. No-adaptation and adaptation condi-
tions were presented in separate blocks of testing.
As in Experiment 2, no-adaptation control blocks
were completed both before and after an adaptation
block. These control blocks were used to provide a
measure of participants’ ratings of the weight of boxes
lifted by test actors in the absence of an adapting actor
in the scene. There were nine movies used during each
control block: 3 test actors (two males, one female)3 3
test action conditions (6, 10, and 14 kg). During each
control block, each of the nine movies was presented
ﬁve times in a pseudorandom order. All other
procedures were the same as in Experiment 2.
Between the two control blocks was a single adapta-
tion block. During the adaptation block 72 different
movies (2 adaptation conditions3 4 adaptation action
repetitions33 test actors33 test action conditions) were
presented. Movies (trials) occurred once in a random
order. All other procedures were the same as for the
adaptation blocks in Experiment 2, except two breaks of
1 to 2min were given to participants after 24 trials to help
reduce participant fatigue.
We calculated aftereffects for each of the four
adapting action repetition conditions and each of the
two adaptation conditions. The mean ratings of the
weights of boxes lifted by the test actors for control
trials were subtracted from the mean ratings of the
weights of the boxes lifted by the test actors in each
adaptation condition to generate eight aftereffects (four
heavy and four light). Positive values indicated that test
actors appeared to lift heavier boxes, negative values
indicated that test actors appeared to lift lighter boxes,
and zero indicated no effect of the adapting actor.
Results
An ANOVA with adaptation condition and adapting
action repetition as within-subject factors was used to
test the magnitudes of the different aftereffects. As in
Experiments 1 and 2, the behavior of the adapting actor
had a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the perception of the
actions executed by the test actors: main effect of
adaptation condition, F(1, 16)¼ 11.90, p¼ 0.003, gp2¼
0.43. There was no main effect of adaptation action
repetition, F(3, 48)¼ 1.00, p¼ 0.399, gp2¼ 0.06.
However, importantly, there was an interaction between
adaptation condition and adaptation action repetition,
F(2.07, 33.08)¼ 16.36, p , 0.001, gp2¼ 0.51
(Greenhouse-Geisser correction applied), indicating that
aftereffects increased magnitude with adapting action
repetition (Figure 2c). Previously examined aftereffects
(Barraclough et al., 2009, 2012; Hershenson, 1989, 1993;
Leopold et al., 2005) increase with adapting stimulus
exposure and can be best modeled with a logarithmic
function. To test this we ﬁtted (using an unconstrained
nonlinear minimization of the sum or squared residuals;
MATLAB 2016; MathWorks) simple (linear, exponen-
tial, logarithmic) functions to the data to determine the
best model of the action recognition aftereffect increase
with adapting action exposure. Exponential functions
provided the best models for both the data following
adaptation to lifts of light boxes (R¼ 0.91) and the data
following adaptation to lifts of heavy boxes (R¼ 0.91).
(R values for the alternate functions are listed in
Supplementary Table S1.)
Experiment 4: Duration of action
aftereffects
Adaptation aftereffects typically decay exponentially
over time (e.g., Barraclough et al., 2009, 2012; Hershen-
son, 1989; Kloth & Schweinberger, 2008; Leopold et al.,
2005; Magnussen & Johnsen, 1986). In Experiment 4, we
therefore examined whether the aftereffects observed
during previous experiments decayed in an exponential
fashion by varying the interval between the last adapting
action and the test action.
Method
Participants
Seventeen participants (13 females, four males;
mean age ¼ 20.3 years, SD ¼ 2.0) took part in the
experiment. The number of participants was based on
a power analysis of the aftereffects measured during
Experiment 1.)
Stimuli
Movies were made in which the actions of two
individual (adapting and test) actors occurred in
succession in a naturalistic fashion. Movies were
similar to those used in Experiment 1; however, we
varied the inter-action interval—that is, the duration
between the offset of the last adapting action and the
onset of the test action (1, 2, 4, and 8 s).
Procedure
The experiment was a within-subject factorial design
with three adaptation conditions (adapt heavy: lift 18
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kg; adapt light: lift 2 kg; no adaptation) and four inter-
action intervals (1, 2, 4, and 8 s). In addition, there were
three test action conditions (lift 6, 10, and 14 kg) and
three test actor identities (two males, one female). Test
action condition and test actor identity were not
conditions of interest and therefore were not analyzed.
They were, however, varied in order to ensure that
participants viewed different actions during experi-
mental testing. No-adaptation and adaptation condi-
tions were presented in separate blocks of testing.
As in Experiment 2, no-adaptation control blocks
were completed both before and after an adaptation
block. These control blocks were used to provide a
measure of participants’ ratings of the weight of boxes
lifted by test actors in the absence of an adapting actor
in the scene. There were nine movies used during each
control block: 3 test actors (two males, one female)3 3
test action conditions (6, 10, and 14 kg). During each
control block, each of the nine movies was presented
ﬁve times in a pseudorandom order. All other
procedures were the same as for Experiment 2.
Between the two control blocks was a single
adaptation block. During the adaptation block 72
different movies were presented: 2 adaptation condi-
tions3 4 inter-action intervals3 3 test actors3 3 test
action conditions. Movies (trials) occurred once in a
random order. All other procedures were as for the
adaptation blocks in Experiment 2, except two breaks
of 1 to 2 min were given to participants after 24 trials to
help reduce participant fatigue.
We calculated aftereffects for each of the four inter-
action interval conditions and each of the two
adaptation conditions. We subtracted the mean ratings
of the weights of boxes lifted by the test actors for
control trials from the mean ratings of the weights of
the boxes lifted by the test actors in each adaptation
condition to generate eight aftereffects (four heavy and
four light). Positive values indicated that test actors
appeared to lift heavier boxes, negative values indicated
that test actors appeared to lift lighter boxes, and zero
indicated no effect of the adapting actor.
Results
An ANOVA with adaptation condition and inter-
action interval as within-subject factors was used to
test the magnitudes the different aftereffects. As in
previous experiments, the behavior of the adapting
actor had a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the perception of
the actions executed by the test actors: main effect of
adaptation condition, F(1, 16)¼ 29.40, p , 0.001, gp2
¼ 0.65. There was no main effect of inter-action
interval, F(3, 48) ¼ 2.66, p ¼ 0.850, gp2 ¼ 0.02;
however, there was an interaction between adaptation
condition and inter-action interval, F(3, 48)¼ 3.1, p¼
0.036, gp
2 ¼ 0.16. Previously examined aftereffects
(Barraclough et al., 2009, 2012; Hershenson, 1989,
1993; Leopold et al., 2005) have shown a decrease in
aftereffect magnitude over time best modeled by an
exponential decay function. To test this we ﬁtted
(using an unconstrained nonlinear minimization of
the sum or squared residuals; MATLAB 2016) simple
(linear, exponential, logarithmic) functions to the
data to determine the best model of the action
recognition aftereffect decay. The decay over time
(Figure 2d) could be best modeled by an exponential
function ﬁtted to the data following adaptation to
lifts of light boxes (R ¼ 0.91) and a logarithmic
function ﬁtted to the data following adaptation to
lifts of heavy boxes (R ¼ 0.86). (R values for the
alternate functions tested are listed in Supplementary
Table S2.)
Experiment 5: Effect of adaptation
on the actor’s belief state
The previous experiments demonstrated that adap-
tation in naturalistic environments can generate
aftereffects that inﬂuence action recognition. Howev-
er, actions can also provide information about the
internal mental state of the actor (e.g., Becchio,
Sartori, & Castiello, 2010; Gre`zes et al., 2004; Sartori,
Becchio, Bara, & Castiello, 2009). Inference of mental
states derived from action kinematics is thought to be
a separate processing stage following action recogni-
tion (Frith & Frith, 1999; Hamilton & Grafton, 2006;
Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Van Overwalle & Baetens,
2009). In Experiment 5, we tested whether visual
adaptation could inﬂuence this later stage of process-
ing and inﬂuence inferences about the expectations
individuals have about box weight. Observers viewed
in both life-size orthostereoscopic 3D and small-scale
2D presentation formats adapting actors with differ-
ent expectations of the weight of the box they were to
pick up. Observers then made judgments about the
expectations of the test actors subsequently picking up
boxes.
Method
Participants
Twenty-one participants (13 females, eight males;
mean age¼ 20.9 years, SD ¼ 0.7) took part in the
experiment in which stimuli were presented in 2D,
whereas 23 different participants (six females, 17 males;
mean age¼ 24.7 years, SD ¼ 5.5) took part in the
experiment in which stimuli were presented in 3D.
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Stimuli
Movies were made in which the actions of two
individual actors (adapting and test) occurred in
succession in a naturalistic fashion. In the movies both
the adapting and test actors remained in the scene
throughout the trial. Different stimuli from Set 2 were
combined using video compositing to construct new
movies in which the adapting actor appeared on the left
and a test actor appeared on the right in a natural-
looking room scene. In each movie, the adapting actor
action was always repeated eight times. Although this
resulted in a somewhat unnaturalistic jump in actor
posture from the last frame of the action clip to the ﬁrst
frame of the next clip, it was not possible to generate a
sequence of multiple similar actions because actors
could not be deceived about the weight of the box eight
times in a row.
Procedure
Experiment 5 had a factorial design with viewing
condition (life-size orthostereoscopic 3D, small-scale
2D) as a between-subjects factor and adaptation
condition (adapt overestimation, Movie 4; adapt
underestimation, Movie 5; no action [control], Movie
6) as the within-subject factor. In addition, there were
four test actor identities (two males, two females) and
ﬁve test action conditions (lift 6, 8, 10, 12, and 14 kg.
(Because the expectation of the test actors was that the
box weight would be 10 kg, each test weight
corresponds to different over- and underestimations;
see Method.) Test action condition and test actor
identity were not conditions of interest; however, they
were varied in order to ensure that participants viewed
different actions during experimental testing. No-
adaptation control blocks were completed both before
and after two adaptation blocks.
There were 20 movies used during each control
block: 4 test actors (two males, two female)3 5 test
action conditions (6, 8, 10, 12, and 14 kg). Each of the
20 videos was presented in a pseudorandom order and
presented four times in total during each control block
(total¼ 80 trials). In control blocks, trials began with
the test actor standing still for 2 s followed by the
action without the presence of any adapting actor in the
room. The screen turned black, indicating that the
participant was to respond during a 3-s interval.
Participants were required to judge whether the test
actor had a true or false expectation of the weight of
the box and, if false, whether and to what extent the
weight was over- or underestimated. Responses were
made on a linear scale of symbols printed on keyboard
keys: ‘‘- - - -,’’ ‘‘- - -,’’ ‘‘- -,’’ ‘‘-,’’ ‘‘0,’’ ‘‘þ,’’ ‘‘þþ,’’ ‘‘þþþ,’’
and ‘‘þþþþ.’’ The symbols represented a continuum
from an extreme underestimation (‘‘- - - -’’) through
true estimation (‘‘0’’) to an extreme overestimation (‘‘þ
þþþ’’). For analysis, these symbols were converted to a
range of 4 to þ4.
Adaptation conditions were tested in two counter-
balanced blocks where in each block the adapting actor
was either over- or underestimating the weight of the
lifted box. Within a block, all other conditions (four
test actor identities and ﬁve test weights) were
randomized. At the start of each adaptation block, an
initial preadaptation movie of the adapting actor lifting
the box 24 times was displayed. The ﬁrst trial began as
soon as the preadaptation phase had ﬁnished. Each
trial began with 2 s of adapting and test actor
inactivity, followed by the adapting actor lifting his or
her box onto the table eight times and a 1-s inter-action
interval during which both actors stood still. After this,
the test actor lifted his or her box. The screen turned
black, indicating that the participant was to respond
during a 3-s interval. During adaptation blocks,
participants were required to judge whether the test
actor had a true or false expectation of the weight of
the box as for the control blocks.
Linear functions were ﬁtted to the mean estimates of
the test stimuli across both control conditions to assess
participants’ ability to distinguish over- and underes-
timations. Data from one participant (female, age¼ 26
years) tested with the 3D presentation format were
excluded from further analysis because the participant
could not distinguish over- and underestimations
correctly (slope of linear function .2 SD from the
mean). To calculate aftereffects, for each participant
and each presentation format we subtracted the mean
estimate of the expectation of test actors during control
trials from the mean estimate of the expectation of test
actors during each adaptation condition. Positive
values indicated that test actors appeared to overesti-
mate the weight of the box they were to lift, negative
values indicated that test actors appeared to underes-
timate the weight of the box they were to lift, and zero
indicated no effect of adaptation.
Results
An ANOVA with adaptation condition and presen-
tation format as factors showed that estimates of test
actor expectation were signiﬁcantly changed by the
behavior of the adapting actor—main effect of
adaptation condition, F(1, 41)¼ 31.6, p , 0.0001, gp2¼
0.44 (Figure 3a)—where test actors appeared to
underestimate box weight following adaption to actors
overestimating box weight and test actors appeared to
overestimate box weight following adaption to actors
underestimating box weights. There was no main effect
of presentation format, F(1, 41)¼ 3.13, p¼ 0.084, gp2¼
0.07. However, aftereffects were smaller during life-size
3D orthostereoscopic presentation—interaction be-
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tween adaptation condition and presentation format,
F(1, 41) ¼ 7.32, p ¼ 0.010, gp2¼ 0.15—although for
both 3D and 2D presentation formats, adaptation
condition resulted in signiﬁcantly different afteref-
fects—paired t tests: 3D t(21)¼2.17, p¼0.042; 2D t(20)
¼ 5.60, p , 0.001. In conclusion, these results show that
inferences about the belief states of individuals are
inﬂuenced by adaptation to the belief states of other
individuals in the social scene.
Experiment 6: A test of cross-action
adaptation
Experiment 5 demonstrated that action adaptation
inﬂuences inferences about the belief state of individ-
uals, but it was not clear to which of two possible
effects the results should be attributed. First, adapta-
tion could have occurred at an abstract level where the
belief states of other individuals are derived. Alterna-
tively, adaptation could have occurred at an earlier
level where the action kinematics are processed, which
then could modulate inferences about belief states. The
stimuli from Set 2 where the adapting actors underes-
timate the weight of the box produce kinematics
consistent with lifting a heavier box; the stimuli where
the actors overestimate the weight of the box produce
kinematics consistent with lifting a lighter box. Thus,
adaptation to an underestimation (or heavy lift) results
in a perception of an overestimation (or lighter lift),
and thus the two mechanisms are indistinguishable.
In Experiment 6 we tested the level of action
understanding at which adaptation occurred by exam-
ining whether adaptation to actor expectations trans-
ferred across different actions. Representations of the
belief state of others are rather abstract and do not rely
on speciﬁc or easily predicted action kinematics, as
mental state can be derived from many different stimuli
(e.g., Heider & Simmel, 1944). The transference of
adaptation from one action to another would indicate
adaptation occurring at such an abstract representation
of actor mental state.
Method
Participants
Twenty-one participants (19 females, two males;
mean age¼ 24.0 years, SD ¼ 3.6) took part in the
experiment.
Stimuli
As in Experiment 5, movies were made in which the
actions of two individual actors (adapting and test)
occurred in succession in a naturalistic fashion. In the
movies, both the adapting and test actors remained in
the scene throughout the trial. Different stimuli from
Set 3 were combined using video compositing to
construct new movies in which the adapting actor
appeared on the right and a test actor appeared on the
left in a natural-looking room scene (Figure 1b). In
each movie, as in Experiment 5, the adapting actor
action was repeated eight times.
Procedure
Experiment 6 was a within-subject test of the effect
of adaptation to the belief state of an actor pulling a
lever on the belief state of another actor lifting a box.
The adapting actor pulled levers emerging from a box
(see General method), where they underestimated,
Figure 3. Effect of adaptation on inferences about belief state. (a) Changes in the perception of the test actors’ expectations of box
weights following adaptation to another individual’s box-lifting actions. (b) Changes in the perception of actors’ expectations of box
weight following adaptation to lever-pulling actions. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
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overestimated, or had a correct estimation (control) of
the force required to execute the pull action. Test actors
lifted boxes onto a table, where they had seven levels of
overestimation and underestimation of the force
required to execute the lift action (2.5, 5, 7.5, 10, 12.5,
15, and 17.5 kg). Given that test actor underestimations
may be perceived as the test actor lifting heavy boxes
and test actor overestimations may be perceived as the
test actor lifting light boxes, any aftereffects that may
be observed could be due to a hypothetical force
adaptation rather than adaptation to the belief state.
To control for this we included two additional
adaptation conditions where the adapting actors pulled
a heavy (8 kg) lever and a light (1 kg) lever, during
which the adapting actor had a correct estimation of
the force required to execute the action.
Using pilot data we matched the adapting stimuli on
their perceived force required while varying the
perceived belief state. That is, in the underestimate and
heavy adaptation conditions the perceived weight was
roughly equivalent, but in the underestimation condi-
tion the perceived underestimation was greater. Simi-
larly, in the overestimation and light conditions the
perceived weight was roughly equivalent, but in the
overestimation condition the perceived overestimation
was greater (Table 1).
Pilot data showed that the pull action in which the
adapting actor overestimated the force required (ex-
pected 9 kg, executed 5 kg) and the pull action in which
the adapting actor pulled a light lever (expected and
executed 1 kg) appeared to be executed with equivalent
force (t¼ 0.27, p¼ 0.79). In addition, the pull action in
which the adapting actor underestimated the force
required (expected 1 kg, executed 5 kg) and the pull
action in which the adapting actor pulled a heavy lever
(expected and executed 9 kg) appeared to be executed
with equivalent force (t¼ 0.97, p¼ 0.37). Thus, in total
there were ﬁve adapting action conditions (adapt
overestimation of pull force, Movie 7; adapt underes-
timation of pull force, Movie 8; adapt pull heavy lever,
Movie 9; adapt pull light lever, Movie 10) and a control
(no adaptation) condition (Movie 11).
No-adaptation control blocks were completed both
before and after an adaptation block. During control
blocks, no adapting actor was present in the room
(upper sequence in Figure 1b); however, the stimuli and
procedure were as for the adapting block. During the
adapting block both the adapting and test actors were
present in the room (lower sequence in Figure 1b); all
conditions (four adapting stimuli, seven test stimuli)
were presented three times in a pseudorandom order.
On any one adaptation trial, initially, the actors stood
still for 2 s. Then the adapting action was repeated eight
times, followed by a 1-s interstimulus interval during
which both actors stood still. Finally, the test actor
lifted the box. The screen turning black indicated to the
participant to respond during a 4-s interval. Participant
response range and data analysis were as for Experi-
ment 5.
Results
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA showed that
aftereffects generated by the different adapting stimuli
were not signiﬁcantly different from each other, F(4,
80)¼ 0.40, p¼ 0.81, gp2 ¼ 0.02 (see Figure 3b). All
aftereffects were small and nonsigniﬁcant—all ts(20) ,
0.81, ps . 0.32—showing that adaptation to action
force, and actor belief state, does not transfer from one
action to another. In conclusion, Experiment 6 shows
that adaptation to belief state does not occur at a high
abstract level where the precise kinematics of the
actions are irrelevant. Rather, changes in belief state
resulting from visual adaptation appear dependent on
the speciﬁc kinematics of the actions being executed (cf.
Wincenciak et al., 2016).
General discussion
In a series of six experiments we examined the effect
of adaptation on action recognition and inferences of
actor belief state in naturalistic environments. Exper-
iments 1 through 4 showed that action recognition
aftereffects occurred when two individuals were present
in a social scene. Here, the recognition of the actions
executed by one individual is changed by adaptation to
the actions previously executed by the other individual.
These action recognition aftereffects are similarly sized
when measured using small screens typically found in
psychophysics laboratories, as when measured using
life-size orthostereoscopic 3D presentation in a virtual
reality environment (Experiment 1). Action recognition
aftereffects were similarly sized irrespective of the view
from which the two actors were seen (Experiment 2),
indicating that the aftereffects rely on high-level view-
independent mechanisms (Barraclough & Jellema,
2011; Jellema & Perrett, 2006). The action recognition
aftereffects showed both a build-up with adaptation
Adaptation condition
Perceived weight Perceived expectation
M SD M SD
Underestimation 7.3 1.9 2.4 2.3
Heavy 6.8 1.4 1.3 1.5
Overestimation 1.9 0.6 1.6 1.6
Light 2.0 0.9 0.5 0.7
Table 1. Perceived weight and perceived expectation in each of
the adaptation conditions.
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exposure (Experiment 3) and decay over time (Exper-
iment 4). These dynamics are characteristic of other
previously observed visual aftereffects and indicate that
the effects we observe here are likely due to adaptation
rather than other potential mechanisms. Experiment 5
showed that inferences about the belief state of
individuals are inﬂuenced by visual adaptation to the
belief state of another individual in the same social
scene. Although Experiment 5 suggested a possible
high-level abstract adaptation that affects action
understanding, during Experiment 6 belief state after-
effects disappeared when the adapting and test actors
were executing different actions. The results of Exper-
iment 6 showed that aftereffects do not transfer from
one action to another and therefore ruled out the
possibility of high-level abstract adaptation to belief
states. We believe that the most parsimonious expla-
nation is that action recognition adaptation modulates
subsequent inferences about the belief state of individ-
uals.
Applicability of results to natural viewing
During Experiments 1 through 4 the social scenes
unfolded in a naturalistic fashion in which the adapting
actor would execute a number of actions and then the
test actor would execute his or her action. Unlike
previous adaptation experiments with action stimuli
(Barraclough & Jellema, 2011; Barraclough et al., 2009;
de la Rosa et al., 2014; Roether et al., 2009; Troje et al.,
2006)—and indeed with face stimuli (e.g., Chen, Yang,
Wang, & Fang, 2010; Leopold et al., 2001; Rhodes,
Jeffery, Watson, Clifford, & Nakayama, 2003)—where
stimuli were disembodied, were limited to dots of light,
or would appear and disappear from the screen in
quick succession, the current scenes were more akin to
the natural environments we typically experience. Our
results indicate that during natural viewing of social
scenes in which more than one individual is present,
visual adaptation can change our ability to recognize
the actions of individuals accurately. For Experiments
5 and 6, the social scenes were somewhat less realistic:
Here the actions executed by the adapting actor in the
scene had to be repeated eight times rather than having
the adapting actor execute eight different actions. This
was necessary due to the nature of the stimuli: It was
not possible to recruit actors who could be fooled
repeatedly about the weight of boxes they were to lift.
This limitation does potentially limit the generalizabil-
ity of the distortions in belief state observed with visual
adaptation during Experiment 5.
During Experiments 1 and 5 we compared aftereffect
magnitudes when participants viewed the natural
scenes via different presentation formats. Action
recognition aftereffects were similarly sized when scenes
were presented in life-size orthostereoscopic 3D, in
small-scale 2D, and in life-size 2D. The full orthoste-
reoscopic 3D presentation allows a very naturalistic
experience of the social scene in which the participant
experiences the actors appearing in the same room as
them. Actors and physical environment were of the
correct size and correct depth information, with
realistic lighting and shadows cast by the actors in the
scene. Together, these cues provide a compelling sense
of the presence of the scene. Although the virtual
reality experience is not identical to our natural
experience, our results highlight the importance of
action (and presumably other) aftereffects appearing
during our daily experience. In addition, these results
show that the action recognition aftereffects studied
using typical psychophysics equipment in the labora-
tory are informative about our daily experiences. Belief
state aftereffects were also observed during life-size
orthostereoscopic 3D presentation; however, they were
much smaller than those observed with a small-scale
2D presentation format. A somewhat parallel effect has
been seen previously, where functional magnetic
resonance adaptation to the real 3D presentation of
objects is markedly reduced compared with the
presentation of the same objects on a screen in 2D
(Snow et al., 2011). Although our stimuli are more
complex and social, and although functional magnetic
resonance adaptation cannot be directly compared with
the psychophysical adaptation we measured, these
results do indicate differences in the way the brain
responds to repeated presentation of realistic 3D
stimuli and 2D images of stimuli. Furthermore, other
research suggests that we interact in distinct ways with
our 2D and 3D world (e.g., Holmes & Heath, 2013).
Our results raise the concern that studying the more
complex higher order and abstract forms of action
understanding with unnaturalistic viewing formats in
typical psychophysics and neuroimaging laboratories
does not automatically inform us about the perfor-
mance of action understanding in real-life conditions.
Sensitivity to viewpoint
Action recognition aftereffects were similarly sized
irrespective of the view from which the adapting and
test actors were seen. When the test actor was seen from
a perspective 1808 rotated away from the view of the
adapting actor, aftereffects were not signiﬁcantly
different from the aftereffects when the test and
adapting actors were seen from the same perspective. A
similar view independence has been seen previously for
whole-body walking aftereffects (Barraclough & Jelle-
ma, 2011). In contrast, some other high-level afteref-
fects for hand actions (Barraclough et al., 2009) and
face expressions and identities (Benton, Jennings, &
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Chatting, 2006) show a mixture of viewpoint indepen-
dence and viewpoint dependence. The differences seen
in the degree of viewpoint dependence observed in
previous results and this study may be due to the nature
of the stimuli presented. The greater viewpoint
dependence is observed in the studies examining
processing of body parts (hands, faces), whereas
viewpoint independence is observed in those studies
examining whole-body aftereffects. This increase in
viewpoint independence may reﬂect the transition from
processing body parts to more comprehensive repre-
sentations of bodies in a hierarchical fashion (Fleischer,
Caggiano, Thier, & Giese, 2013; Giese & Poggio, 2003;
Jellema & Perrett, 2006).
Adaptation dynamics
The action recognition aftereffects we observe here
have much in common with other demonstrations of
action aftereffects and other visual aftereffects. We see
an increase in aftereffect magnitude with repetition of
adapting actor action and an exponential decay (for the
light aftereffect) over time, inconsistent with a simple
priming effect but consistent with studies investigating
the dynamics of tilt (Magnussen & Johnsen, 1986),
motion (Hershenson, 1989), face identity (Leopold et
al., 2005), face conﬁguration (Rhodes et al., 2007),
gender (Ghuman, McDaniel, & Martin, 2010), biolog-
ical motion (Troje et al., 2006), hand action (Barra-
clough et al., 2009), and whole-body aftereffects
(Barraclough et al., 2012). Because the time course of
the action recognition aftereffects we observe follows
this classic time course, it suggests that the adapted
mechanism is perceptual in nature and is neither an
artifact of participant behavior during the experimental
task nor perhaps due to other postperceptual processes
(see below).
Adaptation to belief state
Adaptation was also shown to inﬂuence judgments
about the belief state of individuals (Experiment 5). On
the face of it, these effects might appear consistent with
repulsive aftereffects similar to those observed follow-
ing adaptation to hand actions (Barraclough et al.,
2009; de la Rosa et al., 2014) or whole-body actions
(Experiments 1 through 4; Barraclough & Jellema,
2011). Interpretation of the mechanisms underlying
these changes in the inferences about the belief state of
individuals, however, is difﬁcult. We therefore con-
ducted Experiment 6 to clarify the putative site of the
adaptation effect. This experiment showed that adap-
tation to belief state did not transfer from one action to
another. Such supracategorical adaptation would be
expected if there was adaptation at an abstract level of
the belief state. Indeed, areas of the cortex involved in
making inferences about the mind of other individuals
(theory of mind) respond to a range of very different
stimuli conveying the same meaning (e.g., Castelli et al.,
2010; Castelli, Frith, Happe, & Frith, 2002; Saxe &
Kanwisher, 2003). That adaptation to one action does
not transfer to a different action indicates that
adaptation is not acting at an action-independent
abstract level but rather at an action-dependent level.
Rather, we believe that adaptation at a conceptually
lower level where the actions themselves are distin-
guished (Barraclough & Jellema, 2011; Barraclough et
al., 2009; Kuravi, Caggiano, Giese, & Vogels, 2016) is
the most parsimonious explanation for the effects we
observed in Experiment 5. Adaptation to the adapting
actor underestimating the weight of the box will also
result in adaptation to kinematics associated with
lifting an unexpectedly heavier box. The perceived
change in the test actors’ judgments of the weight of the
boxes such that they appear to overestimate the box
weights may be due to a change in the representation of
the kinematics of box lifting such that they appear
more akin to the kinematics associated with lifting an
unexpectedly lighter box. Similar but opposite effects
are also observed following adaptation to adapting
actors overestimating box weights. In short, changes in
belief state attribution can be explained by changes in
perceived kinematics—a less abstract task.
Possible alternate mechanisms underlying
action adaptation
Lower level retinotopic adaptation
There is a possibility that there might be some
inﬂuence of retinotopic adaptation or adaptation at
earlier stages in the visual system. Adaptation of
retinotopic mechanisms might occur if the participants
ﬁxated the screens in such a way that the position of the
adapting actor in visual space subtended one region of
the retina and then, when observing the test actor, their
ﬁxation was such that the test actor subtended the same
region of visual space. Although we do not rule out the
possibility that adaptation at a low level in the visual
system may occur in parallel, we do not believe they are
the dominating effects we observe here. First, the
stimuli were presented for a long period of time (.30
s), and although we did not measure eye movements,
the participant freely viewed the stimuli; therefore, it is
likely that they moved their eyes during testing and did
not ﬁxate in the rather idiosyncratic fashion described
above. Second, the low-level characteristics (e.g., shape,
color, form, motion) of the adapting and test actors
were very different: They were different identities and
sizes, wore different clothes, and so on. Finally, during
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Experiment 2 when the adapting and test stimuli were
seen from very different views, similarly sized afteref-
fects were observed even though the actors could not
overlap the same retinotopic regions.
Postperceptual processes
One possibility is that the results we observe are due
to postperceptual processes in which the cognitive
decisions of the participants are inﬂuenced (Morgan,
Melmoth, & Solomon, 2013). A deﬁning characteristic
of perceptual adaptation is that aftereffects build up
logarithmically with adaptation stimulus exposure and
decline exponentially with time (Gibson & Radner,
1937; Hershenson, 1989; Leopold et al., 2005). A
postperceptual decision-making process is unlikely to
show these speciﬁc characteristic dynamics. Consistent
with an explanation based on perceptual adaptation,
Experiments 3 and 4 showed that action recognition
aftereffects increased with adapting action recognition
and declined with time. Although the build-up with
adaptation was best modeled by exponential functions,
the aftereffects with one, two, and four repeats of the
adaptation action were small and nonsigniﬁcant,
making drawing conclusions about the best-ﬁtting
function difﬁcult. Overall, however, the relationship
between aftereffect magnitude and adaptation duration
and duration between the adapting and test stimuli is
strongly suggestive of genuine perceptual adaptation
processes.
Even stronger evidence against a postperceptual
explanation for the results we observe comes from
Experiment 6. In this experiment we found that
adaptation to one action did not inﬂuence perception
of another action. If adaptation effects were due to a
shift in participants’ decisions made about the belief
state of individuals, then we would expect this to be
independent of the actions that they observed; however,
cross-action adaptation was not observed. Indeed,
aftereffects were dependent on the kinematics of the
actions executed by the adaptation and test actors.
Conclusions
During observation of two individuals in naturalistic
scenes, perceptual adaptation aftereffects inﬂuence
action recognition and inferences about the belief state
of individuals. These action recognition aftereffects are
view independent and show the same characteristic
dynamics as seen with more simple stimuli and with
some less naturalistic experimental designs. These
distortions in social perception that occur whilst
viewing naturalistic scenes can be explained by visual
adaptation of mechanisms coding speciﬁc action
kinematics; they are neither attributable to low-level
adaptation, nor response shifts due to top-down
inﬂuences (Morgan et al., 2013), nor do they need to
invoke simulation mechanisms (Gallese & Goldman,
1998) nor higher-order Theory-of-Mind processes
(Gallagher & Frith, 2003). Our results suggest that the
perception of an agent’s action in a naturalistic social
scene, and the interpretation of the agent’s mental
state, is dependent not only on what that agent is doing
but also on the adaptive effect induced by other agents
in the social environment.
Keywords: perception, social cognition, theory of
mind, adaptation
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